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Civil Tax Penalties: Changes and Recommendations
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of our federal revenue system is based upon the
principle of self enforcement. It depends upon the honest disclo-
sure of income, deductions, and exemptidns by over 150 million
taxpayers who file their individual, corporate, and fiduciary
federal income tax returns yearly.' Consequently, the self-asses-
sing individual taxpayer has the ultimate responsibility in pre-
paring his federal income tax returns.
Furthermore, as long as our tax laws are based upon the
principle of self enforcement, the temptation for the unsuper-
vised taxpayer to falsify his income tax returns and pay less
than due is substantial and frequently persuasive.2 A cursory
examination of the cases reflect how persuasive this temptation
can be. Examples of these cases include not only the "stereoty-
ped dishonest gangster, ' 3 but also the "sterotyped honest citi-
1. Civil and criminal tax penalties pertain not only to income taxes, but
also to other federal taxes. Examples of such include gift taxes, United States v.
Alker, 260 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1958); excise taxes, United States v. Linenberg, 179 F.
Supp. 808 (D.C. Pa. 1959); admission taxes, United States v. H.J.K. Theatre
Corp., 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956); social security and withholding taxes, Wilson
v. United States, 250 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1958); and wagering taxes, United States
v. Shaffer, 291 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1961). Reference to the aforementioned kinds of
taxes are hereinafter referred to as "tax laws".
2. No one really knows how prevalent tax evasion is. Statistical studies
seem to be lacking. However, a not too recent study by the Internal Revenue
Service contained some interesting conclusions. For example, errors on taxpay-
er's tax returns occured two out of every five in 1965, 85% of them in the tax-
payers favor. Furthermore, this study reflected approximately 51% of the sub-
jects questioned believed almost every taxpayer would cheat if he thought he
could get away with it. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, The Role of Sanctions in
Tax Compliance, Sept. 1968 (Unpublished).
3. United States v. Rubino, 431 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1970). Alleged Mafia
enforcer living in Detroit.
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zen," involving judges,4 lawyers,5 doctors,6 accountants,7 may-
ors,8 insurance brokers, 9 and university professors. 0 Conse-
quently, it is necessary for the Internal Revenue Service
[hereinafter the "Service"] to discourage this temptation and
encourage compliance with the tax laws by penalizing the
underpaying taxpayer. Mr. Justice Grier, over a century ago,
succinctly stated the rationale for the imposition of tax penal-
ties upon underpaying taxpayers.
The purpose of penalties inflicted upon persons who attempt to de-
fraud the revenue, is to enforce the collection of duties and taxes.
They act in terrorem upon parties whose conscientious scruples are
not sufficient to balance their hopes of profit."
Accordingly, the Service has available at its disposal a wide
variety of tax penalties, both civil and criminal, to "act in ter-
rorem" upon underpaying taxpayers, thereby encouraging
compliance with the tax laws. It is the purpose of this article to
examine the most commonly known and most frequently en-
countered civil tax penalties, including an examination of re-
cent recommendations adopted by the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States 12 [hereinafter "The Conference"]. Said
recommendations are designed to improve the effectiveness
and fairness of the civil tax structure by restructuring certain
key civil tax penalties.'3
4. United States v. Polack, 442 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1971) (New Jersey county
judge, for failure to file).
5. United States v. Ming, Jr., 466 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1972); Sellin, Profes-
sional Responsibility of the Tax Practitioner, 52 TAXES 584 (1974). Lawyers
seem to be frequently involved in violations of the tax laws.
6. United States v. D'Anna, 450 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1971).
7. United States v. Washburn, 488 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1973).
8. United States v. Miriani, 422 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1970) (Mayor of Detroit).
9. United States v. Haseltine, 419 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1970).
10. United States v. Parks, 411 F.2d 1171 (1st Cir. 1969).
11. Dorsheimer v. United States, 74 U.S. 166, 173 (1868).
12. The Administrative Conference of the United States (hereinafter "the
Conference"] was established as a permanent independent agency by the Ad-
ministrative Conference Act enacted in 1964. The purpose of the Conference is
to develop improvements in the legal procedures by which federal agencies
administer regulatory government programs. Although the Conference may
only recommend changes in administrative procedures, the Chairman is au-
thorized to encourage the departments and agencies to adopt the recommenda-
tions of the Conference and is required by the Administrative Conference Act to
transmit to the President and to Congress an annual report and interim reports
concerning the activities of the Conference, including reports on the implemen-
tation of its recommendations. Recommendations adopted by the Conference
may call for new legislation or for action on the part of affected agencies. A
substantial number of recommendations have been implemented and others are
in the process of implementation. See OFFICE OF FEDERAL REGISTRY, NATIONAL
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 462 (1977-1978).
13. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Internal Revenue. Service Procedures:
Civil Penalties Recommendation 75-7, 41 Fed. Reg. 3984 (1976). [Hereinafter,
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II. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TAx PENALTIES COMPARED
Since the focus of a tax fraud investigation may change at any
time from civil to criminal, it is important to briefly compare the
interplay between the two basic types of penalties. Tax penal-
ties can be divided into two groups: civil, sometimes referred to
as ad valorem penalties, 14 and criminal, sometimes referred to
as specific penalties.
15
Ad valorem penalties are assessed by the Commissioner of
the Service and added to the existing liability. 16 They are con-
sidered additions to the tax due and owing, measured by the
percentage of the total tax liability. 17 Hence, ad valorem penal-
ties are solely monetary in nature. Conversely, specific penalties
are not added to and assessed by the Commissioner but are
imposed only by successful prosecution instituted by the Justice
Department. 8 Since specific penalties take the form of fines
and/or imprisonment, they are not measured by a percentage of
the total tax liability but are applied as a fixed or specific sum to
certain types of misconduct. 19 It should also be noted that these
two types of penalties are not mutually exclusive in that the
same offense may result in the imposition of both ad valorem
and specific penalties. Moreover, a conviction on a criminal
charge does not bar the imposition of ad valorem penalties, and
conversely, an acquittal on a criminal charge does not bar the
same.
20
references will be made to the text of the Conference's report of "Recom-
mendation 75-7", and not to the Federal Register.]
14. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 55.01 (1976 revision);
Powell v. Gleason, 74 P.2d 47, 50 (Ariz. 1937); Annot., 114 A.L.R. 838 (1937).
15. Id. Arthur v. Johnston, 194 S.E. 151, 154 (S.C. 1937).
16. The constitutionality of whether Congress may delegate the penalty
assessment power to an administrative agency was decided long ago. The
constitutionality was attacked on the basis that imposition of the penalty enti-
tled the taxpayer to a jury trial. The Court held otherwise, for the reason that
enforcement of the tax laws was the primary purpose of the penalty since it was
remedial and not punitive in purpose. Hence, an administrative officer could
properly enforce such penalties, e.g. the Commissioner. McDowell v. Heiner, 15
F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1926); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). Subsequently,
it was held that the Seventh Amendment did not entitle one to a jury trial where
ad valorem penalties are involved.
17. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 55.01 (1976 revision).
18. Id. Ledbetter v. Bailey, 274 F. 375 (W.D.N.C. 1921).
19. Supra, note 18 at § 55.01.
20. Hanby v. Comm'r, 67 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1933). Proof of a criminal convic-
tion is sufficient evidence to sustain the imposition of the 50% civil fraud penalty
when asserted for the same years. The taxpayer is collaterally estopped from
III. CIVIL PENALTIES
The most commonly known and frequently encountered civil
penalties are those imposed for failure to file a return or to pay
the tax [hereinafter the "delinquency penalty"],21 for failure to
pay the tax because of negligence or intentional disregard to the
rules and regulations [hereinafter the "negligence penalty"], 22
and for failure to pay the tax because of fraud with intent to
evade payment [hereinafter the "civil fraud penalty"].23
Those who may be held liable for civil penalties include more
than the simple delinquent taxpayer who fails to file his tax
return. Civil penalties may also apply to persons who are under
a special duty to perform a particular act. Examples of such
include the following: employees in a corporation,24 partners in
a partnership,25 both the corporation and one or more of its
officers, 26 private foundations, 27 and trusts. 28
In comparing the interplay between civil penalties, it is im-
portant to note that delinquency and negligence penalties may
be concurrently imposed, which are referred to as pyramiding
penalties.29 On the other hand, the imposition' of the civil fraud
penalties precludes the imposition of the delinquency or negli-
gence penalties.30 Consequently, no pyramiding is permitted
when the civil fraud penalty is applied even though the factual
situation may permit such application. 31
denying fraud, and therefore, it is res judicata. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d
262 (5th Cir. 1964); Thomas J. McLaughlin, 29 B.T.A. 247 (1933); MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 55.01 (1976 revision). See also Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). Mr. Justice Brandeis, for the Court, analyzed the
nature of the civil fraud penalty and concluded that an acquittal in a previous
criminal fraud action against the taxpayer would not be res judicata in a subse-
quent civil suit by the government for tax deficiencies arising out of fraud, and
hence, there would be no double jeopardy. His rationale was that civil penalties
are deemed additions to the original tax due and owing, are considered remedial
in nature, and are only intended to indemnify the government for the taxpayer's
misconduct. Therefore, the restrictions of double jeopardy, quantum of proof,
jury trial, and other features of criminal law are not applicable to the Commis-
sioner.
21. I.R.C. § 6651.
22. Id. § 6653(a).
23. Id. § 6653(b).
24. Carding Grill, L.T.D., 38 B.T.A. 669 (1938); Morrow, [1967] TAX CT. MEM.
DEC. (CCH) 242; Erie Coca Cola Bottling Co., 1 B.T.A. 531 (1925).
25. I.R.C. § 6671(b); Calvey v. United States, 448 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1971);
Marcello, [1969] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 189.
26. J.J. Dix, Inc. v. Comm'r, 223 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1955).
27. I.R.C. § 6652(d); Treas. Reg. § 301.6652-2(b); I.R.C. § 6685.
28. I.R.C. § 6652(d)(i); Treas. Reg. § 301.6652-2(c).
29. Robinsons Dairy v. Comm'r, 302 F.2d 42, 45 (10th Cir. 1962).
30. Treas. Reg. § 301.6653-1(b)(2).
31. An example of where such a factual situation may trigger the imposi-
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A. The Delinquency Penalty
In the event of a failure to file a tax return on or before the
prescribed due date, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
[hereinafter "the Code"]32 provides a penalty to be imposed at
5% per month33 based on the net amount due, not to exceed 25%.
Pursuant to the 1969 Tax Reform Act, the Code also provides a
penalty for failure to pay the income tax shown on the return on
or before the prescribed due date34 and for failure to pay a tax
deficiency within 10 days of notice and demand.
35
The penalty will not be imposed, notwithstanding the fact of a
failure to pay, provided the taxpayer can affirmatively show
that his failure to pay arose as a result of "reasonable cause and
not due to willful neglect. '3 6 Furthermore, whenever two or
more delinquency penalties apply, the combination of such can
never exceed the maximum of 25% due to a limitation expressly
provided in the Code.37 However, this limitation does not apply
until the maximum penalty of 25% is reached. Until then, the
possibility for imposing the maximum penalty of 25% increases
accordingly when two or more combinations of different delin-
quency penalties apply. It is also important to parenthetically
note that this particular penalty does not require a certain "state
tion of either the civil fraud penalty or the delinquency penalty arises when the
taxpayer fails to file his tax return because he disliked the administration and
adopted a belligerent and non-cooperative attitude toward the investigating
agent. The failure to file coupled with the "badge of fraud" of non-cooperative-
ness triggered the civil fraud penalty to the exclusion of the delinquency penal-
ty. Powell v. Granquist, 252 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1958). See also, Otis Blackwell,
[1965] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 252; Oswill M. Cummings, Jr., [1968] TAx CT.
MEM. DEC. (CCH) 52.
32. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1).
33. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 defines a month as a calendar
month where a return is required to be filed on the last day of any month. If a
return is required to be filed on any day within a month, the period terminating
on the corresponding day of the calendar month is considered a month. This
was not true of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 since it defined a month on a
thirty day basis. For example, the period of delinquency in the case of a corpora-
tion income tax return due on March 15 but filed on April 15, is now one month,
31 calendar days. Under the Code of 1954, only a 5% penalty applies as opposed
to the 10% penalty under the Code of 1939. Treas. Reg. 301.6651-1(a)(2).
34. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2).
35. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(3).
36. I.R.C. § 6651(e)(1); Treas. Reg. 301.6651-1(a). For a discussion of rea-
sonable cause see text infra page 472.
37. I.R.C. § 6651(c)(1). For example, if the failure to file penalty (5-25%) and
of mind" before it is imposed. The failure is sufficient in and of
itself to trigger the penalty.
(1) The Deficiency Requirement-Unpaid Tax
There must be a deficiency or unpaid tax for the delinquency
penalty to apply. This is determined by the amount required to
be shown on the tax return reduced by: (a) the amount of any
part of the tax which is paid on or before the original due date,
and (b) the amount of any credit against the tax which may be
claimed on the return. 8 For example, any prepayments of in-
come tax liability, either through withholding or through pay-
ments of estimated tax liability, would reduce the net amount
upon which the delinquency penalty would be computed. Like-
wise, a net operating loss carryforward excuses the delinquen-
cy imposed for the subsequent year39 to the extent that it re-
duces or eliminates the deficiency or unpaid tax. On the other
hand, a net operating loss carryback does not excuse the delin-
quency penalty imposed for the earlier year ° even though it
reduces or eliminates the deficiency or unpaid tax. This holding
is based on the rationale that it would be unfair to allow a future
loss to reduce or possibly eliminate a past wrong, i.e. past failure
to file or pay.
In light of the above, it becomes apparent that this is the first
logical stage of examination when contesting the imposition of
the delinquency penalty. Counsel should closely scrutinize the
alleged deficiency not only to reduce the taxable amount upon
which the original tax will be based, but also to reduce or poss-
ibly eliminate the amount upon which the penalty will be
computed.
(2) Sufficiency of the Tax Return
In order to avoid the imposition of the delinquency penalty, it
is necessary not only to file a timely tax return, but to file a tax
return which sufficiently complies with the official forms and
regulations. A sufficient return is one giving substantial infor-
mation as to the specific items of the taxpayer's gross income,
the failure to pay penalty (1/2-25%) applies to any month, the failure to file
penalty for that month (5%) is reduced by the failure to pay penalty for that
month (1/2%). When the failure to file penalty (5%) and the failure to pay an
assessed deficiency applies (1/2%), the failure to pay the deficiency is reduced by
the amount of the failure to file penalty attributable to the assessed deficiency.
38. I.R.C. § 6651(b); Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(b).
39. Goodwin Crockery Co., 37 T.C. 355 (1961), aff'd on other grounds, 315
F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963); Dorfman v. Comm'r, 394 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1968).
40. Rev. Rul. 72-484; C.V.L. Corp., 17 T.C. 812 (1951); Nick v. Dunlap, 185
F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1951).
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deductions, and credits to which he is entitled.41 Perfect accura-
cy and completeness is not necessary to constitute a sufficient
return provided it purports to be a return, sworn as such, and
reflects an honest good faith endeavor to satisfy the law.42
An examination of the appropriate case law indicates certain
factual situations where sufficiency of a tax return becomes
critical in determining whether a delinquency penalty is appli-
cable. Examples of such involve incomplete or inadequate re-
turns,43 wrong or different returns,44 unauthorized signatures of
other spouse on a joint return,45 returns signed for the taxpayer
by the preparer,46 corporate returns,47 and proof of filing of a
return.48 A concise rule of law cannot be drawn from the
aforementioned factual situations since the cases have been
decided primarily on questions of fact and not of law.
41. Comm'r v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219 (1944). David Meade Peebles,
[1956] TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 160, aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 249 F.2d
92 (4th Cir. 1957). A return with absolutely no information on it except a taxpay-
er's name, address, and an arbitrary amount labeled as tax due cannot be
regarded as a "return" within the meaning of the Code.
42. Zellerback Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934).
43. I.R.C. § 6061; Jessee Ullman Reaves, 31 T.C. 690 (1958), aff'd, 295 F.2d
336 (5th Cir. 1959). An unsigned return will not constitute filing of a return.
44. Comm'r v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219 (1944). The filing of a corporate
return on Form 1120 would not relieve a personal holding company of its duty to
file a personal holding company return on Form 1120H. See also, Pike Holding
Co., 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 110 (1952). Inadvertent use or use in good faith of the wrong
form of return where all material facts are disclosed may avoid the delinquency
penalty.
45. Miller v. Comm'r, 237 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956). A return is sufficient
although signed and filed by a wife on behalf of her husband with his authority,
but without a power of attorney. For further authority clarification, see I.R.C. §
6013(b)(3)(A).
46. Albert K. Tossas, [1955] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 114; Howard Davis,
[1955] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 87. A return is insufficient when it is not signed
by taxpayer himself, but by his accountant who prepared it. But see, Miller v.
Comm'r, note 45 supra.
47. I.R.C. § 6062; A. Brigham Rose, aff'd per curiam, 188 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1951). A corporate return, not verified by anyone and not signed by a duly
authorized officer, is not a sufficient return.
48. The taxpayer has the burden of proof to show filing occurred within the
statutory period. Belsen v. Comm'r, 174 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1949). The following
factors are important in determining whether there was a timely filing:
(a) taxpayer's honesty (including his past record of all proper filings) Thomas
Watson, [1945) TAX CT. MEM. DEc.(P-H) 1091.
(b) introduction of copies of the alleged returns and the proof of payment
thereon, Otho J. Sharpe v. Comm'r, 249 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1957).
(c) The reliability of I.R.S. records relating to the return in question. Ruth W.
Oppenheimer, 16 T.C. 515 (1951); in light of the above cases, it is recommended
(3) Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations begins to run from the date the tax
return is filed, not from the date it is due.49 Therefore, in the case
of the delinquency penalty, the statute is tolled until a tax return
is filed.50 This is crucial since a tax return may not be filed for
several years after its due date, if it is filed at all. Furthermore,
the statute is tolled if the tax return is deemed insufficient; this
emphasizes the importance in considering the issue of sufficien-
cy of a return.
(4) Reasonable Cause-A Defense
Although a taxpayer becomes delinquent by failing to file or
pay his tax return, he may nonetheless avoid the imposition of
the delinquency penalty provided he makes an affirmative
showing that his failure was due to "reasonable cause and not
due to willful neglect." 51 Since the burden of proof rests on the
taxpayer,5 2 it is incumbent upon him to show more than a mere
absence of willful neglect. He must also show the delinquency
arose due to reasonable cause,53 and in absence of such a show-
ing, the imposition of the delinquency penalty remains manda-
tory.5
4
The regulations define "reasonable cause" as follows:
If the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence and
was nevertheless unable to file the return within the prescribed time,
then the delay is due to reasonable cause.5
5
that tax returns be mailed either through certified or registered mail with return
receipt requested.
49. See note 44, supra.
50. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3).
51. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1).
52. Lee v. Comm'r, 227 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1955); William M. Bebb, 36 T.C. 170
(1961); Frank Delaney, [1961] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 310; Breland v. United
States, 323 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1963), when the taxpayer did not sustain his burden
of proving reasonable cause for failure to file returns merely by saying he had
no income.
53. Lee v. Comm'r, 227 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1955).
While we agree with the taxpayers that there is no affirmative evidence
that the delayed filing was deliberate, this will not avail them as a
defense as this is not the language of the statute. It, on the contrary,
provides that the penalty is to be assessed unless reasonable cause for
not filing is shown, and it has been held repeatedly that whether there is
reasonable cause for failure to file a timely return is a question of fact in
respect to which the burden is on the petitioner.
See also West Virginia Steel Corp., 34 T.C. 851, 860 (1960). A mere showing that
delinquency was not due to willful neglect will not suffice. The taxpayer must
also show reasonable cause. Penalty was sustained.
54. Buford Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 153 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1946).
55. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c). For further discussion on the concept of
reasonable cause, see Annot., 3 A.L.R. 2d 617 (1970). Reisner, Relieffrom Delin-
quency Penalties; The Internal Revenue Code, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 183 (1949).
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This definition is too general in form and, therefore, breeds
ambiguity. As a result, the Service has formulated specific stan-
dards for establishing reasonable cause 56 which, however, have
not proved to be an exhaustive remedy for the definitional
shortcomings of the regulations. Consequently, it is necessary to
consult case law for greater clarity regarding the factual situa-
tions which have constituted reasonable cause. 7
For example, a taxpayer may not invoke the defense of rea-
sonable cause when his failure arose as a result of simple forget-
fulness, 58 illness,59 or ignorance of the law60 (even though the
56. II CCH INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT, REASONABLE CAUSE § 4350 at
7637 (1977).
The following eight specific causes for failure to file a return within
the time prescribed by law, if clearly established by the taxpayer, will be
accepted as reasonable.
(a) Where the return was mailed in time (whether or not the envelope
containing the return had sufficient postage) to reach the District Direc-
tor's office in normal course of mails within the legal period.
(b) Where the return was filed within the legal period but in the
wrong district, or directly in the Regional Commissioner's or Commis-
sioner's office.
(c) Where the delay or failure to file was due to erroneous informa-
tion given the taxpayer by an Internal Revenue officer or employee.
(d) Where the delay was caused by death or serious illness of the
taxpayer or serious illness in his/her immediate family.
(e) Where the delay was caused by unavoidable absence of the tax-
payer.
(f) Where delinquency was caused by the destruction by fire or other
casualty of the taxpayer's place of business or business records.
(g) Where the taxpayer, prior to the time for filing return, made an
application to the District Director's office for proper blanks and these
were not furnished him/her in sufficient time to permit the executed
return to be filed on or before its due date.
(h) Where the taxpayer proves that he/she personally visited the of-
fice of the District Director or a local office before the expiration of the
time within which to file return for the purpose of securing information
or aid to properly make out his/her return, and through no fault of
his/her own was unable to see the representative of the Service.
57. The difficulty of the concept of reasonable cause is that it defies defini-
tion with any significant degree of precision. It is comparable to the difficulty
encountered in the area of common law tort involving the standard of the
average reasonable man. In as much as reasonable cause is incapable of being
specifically defined, it would be hazardous to draw a conclusion from any one
particular case as to whether a reasonable cause may be established to defeat
the imposition of the delinquency penalty. The test remains essentially a ques-
tion of fact for the lower court to decide. Estate of Fish v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 358
(6th Cir. 1953); Sanders v. Comm'r, 225 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1955); Stevens Bros.
Foundation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963); Comm'r v. Walker, 326
F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1964).
58. Rogers Hornsby, 26 B.T.A. 591 (1932); Charles Rice, 14 T.C. 503 (1950).
See also Carnie-Gaudie Mfg. Co., 18 B.T.A. 893 (1930), where a tax return was
taxpayer is a non-resident of the United States61). Furthermore,
lack of necessary information (books and records), 62 growing
business and personal problems, 63 lack of funds to hire an ac-
countant to prepare the return,64 lack of funds to pay the tax,6"
constitutional objections to paying taxes for war purposes be-
cause of religious sympathies,66 and wife's assumption husband
would prepare and sign her return6 7 have all been held insuffi-
cient to successfully establish the defense of reasonable cause.
However, the issue of reasonable cause becomes further
complicated when the factual element of reliance is encoun-
tered. When a taxpayer relied upon his employee whose duty it
is to file the return and said employee fails to make a timely
filing, reasonable cause may or may not be sufficient to with-
stand the imposition of the delinquency penalties.68
Furthermore, when a taxpayer relied upon advice from
another party, the sufficiency of reasonable cause may depend
upon any one or combination of some of the following factors:
the advice should be specific and not general; 69 the taxpayer
should in fact rely on said advice;70 the adviser should be
competent or qualified; 71 all relevant facts should be disclosed;72
and the degree of education and intelligence of the taxpayer,
delinquent as a resut of a clerical oversight by a taxpayer with a good reputa-
tion.
59. Alma Williams et. al., 16 T.C. 893 (1951). But see, Gladys Forbes Est., 12
T.C.M. (CCH) 176 (1953) (Mental incompetent, penalty was avoided).
60. Nirosta Corp., 8. T.C. 987 (1947); Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc., 39 T.C.
93 (1962) (Taxpayer mistakenly believed that no return was due or that it was
due on a later date).
61. In Rafael Sabatini, 32 B.T.A. 705, aff'd, rev'd, and modified in part, 98
F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1938). Taxpayer, though a non-resident alien, was represented
in the United States and "undoubtedly could" have obtained a ruling as to the
taxable status of payments received, so that there was no reasonable cause for
not making a return.
62. Bech Chemical Corp., 27 T.C. 840 (1957). Taxpayer alleged lack of
knowledge of actual earnings, but the penalty was sustained.
63. Marion H. Bell, [1957] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 201; Gasman, [1967] TAX
CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 42.
64. Flint & Fulton, Inc., [1956] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 252.
65. Jones, 25 T.C. 1100 (1956).
66. Owens, [1968] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 4.
67. Folsen, Jr.,.[1973] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 98.
68. Bouvelt Realty, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 45 (1942). See Pioneer Auto Service Co.,
36 B.T.A. 213 (1937), where reasonable cause insufficient, penalty was sustained.
69. Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc., 16 T.C. 870 (1951).
70. Genesee Valley Gas Co. v. Comm'r, 180 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
71. Electroline Sales Co., 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 113 (1950). Penalty was avoided
when all facts were made to public accountant of good reputation and tax
experience.
72. Haywood Lumber and Mining Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir.
1950). The Tax Court held reasonable cause was not established since the tax-
payer did not disclose all relevant facts to his accountant, i.e. that a corporation
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particularly in business and tax affairs should be closely
scrutinized."3
(5) Recommendations by the Conference74
In order to achieve greater effectiveness and fairness when
applying the delinquency penalty, the Conference adopted the
following recommendations for its restructure.
(a) Recommendation 75-7(d)(1)(i). As discussed above the
taxpayer may avoid the imposition of the delinquency penalty
provided he affirmatively shows that the delinquency resulted
from "reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. ' 75 The
Conference recommends that the phrase ". . . and not due to
willful neglect" be deleted from the statute.76 The Service
should implement this particular recommendation since the
regulations equate the concept of reasonable cause with the
absence of willful neglect, and assume that the establishment of
reasonable cause satisfies the lack of willful neglect.77 Further-
more, the language "willful neglect" is itself confusing and its
substantive value to the statute is dubious. For example, at least
one court has held that neglect becomes willful when it is inten-
was a personal holding company. However, the Second Circuit Court reversed
Tax Court's holding and thereby placed a limitation on how extensive disclo-
sure of the facts must be in order to establish reasonable cause.
When a corporate taxpayer selects a competent tax expert, supplies him
with all necessary information, and requests him to prepare proper tax
returns, we think the taxpayer has done all that ordinary business care
and prudence can reasonably demand. Sprague had not 'awaited pas-
sively for such tax advice' as Wolcott 'might volunteer to give'; he affir-
matively requested the preparation by his consultant of proper returns.
To require Mr. Sprague to inquire specifically about the personal hold-
ing company act nullifies the very purpose of consulting an expert. We
doubt if anyone would suggest that a client who stated the facts of his
case to his lawyer must, in order to show ordinary business care and
prudence, inquire specifically about the applicability of various legal
principles which may be relevant to the facts stated. The courts have
recognized that reliance on the advice of counsel or of expert account-
ants, sought and received in good faith is 'reasonable cause' for failing
to file a tax return. We think those cases are correctly decided and in
principle control the case at bar.
73. Hermax Co. v. Comm'r, 185 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1949); Electrolin Sales Co.,
10 T.C.M. (CCH) 113 (1950).
74. The Conference is the abbreviated form for Administrative Conference
of the United States. See note 12 supra for an explanation of said agency.
75. See note 51, supra.
76. Recommendation 75-7(d)(1)(i).
77. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c).
tional78 (intentional negligence?). The language should therefore
be deleted.
(b) Recommendation 75-7(d)(1)(ii)(a). The Conference rec-
ommends that the rate of accrual be lowered for the failure to
file penalty so that the 5% rate would apply to the first month,
and a lesser percentage for every month thereafter, not to ex-
ceed 25%. Under the proposed scheme, the monthly rate of the
penalty would be extended under three suggested options, so
that the 25% maximum penalty would not be reached for 11
months, 16 months, or 21 months, respectively,79 instead of the
present 5 month maximum. The reason is that the current pen-
alty escalates too quickly in that it deters delinquent taxpayers
for only five months. Thereafter, the maximum penalty is
reached providing no further incentive or pressure to file the
return beyond fear of civil or criminal fraud penalties. To ex-
tend the rate of accrual over a period of time longer than 5
months would provide greater incentive to comply with the
statute.80
The Service's response to this recommendation was unfavor-
able.81 The proposal would not change the failure to pay penal-
78. Oklahoma City Retailers Ass'n v. United States, 331 F.2d 328 (10th Cir.
1964).
79. Recommendation 75-7(d)(1)(ii)(a).
The monthly rate of the penalty for failure to file a return, established in
subsection 6651(a)(1), should be modified so as to extend the time period
of lateness in filing a return which must elapse before the rate of penalty
to be applied reaches the present aggregate maximum rate of 25 per-
cent. The table below sets forth three options for so modifying the
monthly penalty rate, compared with present law.
Penalty for Period of
each lateness to
Penalty for succeeding reach maximum
first month month penalty
(percent) (percent) (months)
Present law .................. 5 5 5
O ption I ........................ 5 2 11
Option 2 ........................ 5 11/4 16
O ption 3 ........................ 5 1 21
The penalty for failure to pay tax established by subsection 6651(a)(2)
should be imposed in addition to, and not offset against, the foregoing
penalty.
80. Assimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns,
23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 673 (1976). This article provides an excellent discussion
of the Conference's recommendations. Professor Assimow wrote a consultant's
report favoring the Conference's recommendations.
81. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Internal Revenue Service's Responses to
the Recommendations made by the Administrative Conference of the United
States for Improving the Internal Revenue Service Procedures. Civil Penalties.
Response to 75-7, July 1976 (Unpublished)
476
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ty, only the failure to file penalty. Consequently, the Service
contends that when the limitation between these two penalties is
considered, the result is that the present penalty already ex-
tends the period of lateness beyond the Conference's three sug-
gested options.82 Therefore, the present penalty is "too low to
provide a sufficient deterrent to taxpayers who. . . defer pay-
ment of taxes." In lieu of the Conference's recommendations,
the Service proposed retaining the present rate of accrual per
month for the failure to file penalty (5%), while raising the fail-
ure to pay penalty to an equal amount, including a similar limi-
tation when both penalties are imposed concurrently.83
Nonetheless, the Service's proposal should not be adopted
since the rate of accrual still rises too quickly when the penalty
is applied. Raising the failure to pay penalty is too onerous to be
fair. The Conference's recommendation that the rate of accrual
be extended over a longer period of time should be adopted.
However, in view of the present liberal policy in granting auto-
matic extensions for filing income tax returns, the Conference's
first suggested option of 11 months should be adopted, instead
of 16 or 21 months respectively.
(c) Recommendation 75-7(d)(1)(ii)(b). The Conference rec-
ommends that the present penalty, imposing a full month's de-
linquency charge (5%) upon a taxpayer who is only a fraction of
a month delinquent, for example, one day,8 4 should be changed.
The change would pro-rate the monthly rate on a semi-monthly
82. See note 81, supra.
Section 6651(c) contains the formula for this computation. It directs that
for any month in which both penalties apply, the addition for failure to
F ay (0.5%) is allowed as an offset against the failure to file addition (5%).
n other words, during the months when both penalties apply, a max-
imum of 5 percent per month in penalties can be assessed. Of this
amount, 4.5 percent is allocated to the failure to file and 0.5 percent to
the failure to pay penalty. As a result, it requires over forty-eight months
to reach the combined maximum penalty under existing law.
83. Id.
In lieu of the Administrative Conference recommendation, the Service
proposes retaining the failure to file penalty at 5 percent per month and
raising the failure to pay penalty to an equal amount. Where both penal-
ties are assessable at the same time, the failure to pay penalty would not
apply until either the return had been filed without payment or until the
date which is five months from the date prescribed for filing, whichever
is earliest. This would allow up to ten months to reach the combined
maximum penalties, just one month short of the Conference's option 1.
84. See note 33, supra.
basis in order to achieve greater fairness when the delinquency
is de minimis. Nevertheless, the Service disagrees because "...
administrative problems requiring it to work with smaller inter-
est figures . ", would pose too great an administrative
burden.
Notwithstanding the administrative burden, the Conference's
recommendation should be adopted. The Service's burden
caused by computing the delinquency on a semi-monthly basis
is not an interest sufficient to warrant sacrificing fairness and
equity.
(d) Recommendation 75-7(d)(2). The Conference recom-
mends that the Service set forth in the Regulations as opposed
to the Internal Revenue Manual,86 a list of specific standards
establishing reasonable cause for failure to timely file. The
Service agrees with this recommendation. However, it may
prove additionally helpful to clarify in the Regulations the issue
of reliance. The Internal Revenue Manual gives little guidance
concerning this. It states that "whether it is sufficient excuse
that taxpayer relied on advice of counsel that no tax was due or
return required, is not subject to an absolute rule. '8 7 At present,
the uniformity of case law is unsufficient to assist in this re-
gard.88
(e) Recommendation 75-7(e). The Conference also recom-
mends that when a delinquency penalty is assessed, the taxpay-
er be "accorded administrative settlement procedures and the
right to Tax Court review." The rationale is that a taxpayer
should have the right to contest this penalty before payment, as
is true when negligence and civil fraud penalties are assessed.
The Service disagrees on the basis that the "administrative
burden" would be too costly.89 This burden may be alleviated by
amending certain I.R.C. sections which would relieve the Serv-
ice from duplicating time and energy.
For example, before the Service mails the "90 day letter" to
the taxpayer imposing the delinquency penalty, the Service
must examine the return to insure there is no deficiency in tax
which may be barred from later assessment. This is true be-
cause of restrictions on the issuances on subsequent "90 day
85. See note 81, supra.
86. See note 56, supra.
87. Id.
88. See note 72, supra.
89. See note 81, supra.
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letters."9 To avoid these restrictions and thereby alleviate un-
necessary administrative burdens on the Service, the restric-
tions should be changed by amending the pertinent code sec-
tions91 in order to permit additional "90 day letters" to be issued
when the first letter is related solely to the delinquency penalty.
B. The Negligence Penalty
In the event there is an underpayment of tax and said under-
payment is due to "negligence or intentional disregard of rules
and regulations, but without intent to defraud,"92 a 5% penalty is
imposed based on the amount of the underpayment.
(1) Procedural Aspects
The burden of proving due care, thereby rebutting the pre-
sumption of negligence, is on the taxpayer. 93 However, the
Commissioner must specifically allege acts of negligence or the
presumption fails.94 Furthermore, if the Commissioner does not
allege negligence in the alternative when asserting the civil
fraud penalty, and if the taxpayer prevails, the court may not
assert the negligence penalty on behalf of the Commissioner,
even if the facts justify such an assertion.95
Also, pyramiding the negligence penalty with the delinquency
penalty is allowed 96 but not when the civil fraud penalty is
imposed.97 It should be noted that the statute of limitations is not
90. I.R.C. § 6212(c); MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 49.187
(1976 revision).
91. I.R.C. § 6212(c) and I.R.C. § 6659(b).
92. I.R.C. § 6653(a).
Negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations with re-
spect to income or gift taxes. If any part of any underpayment (as
defined in subsection (c)(1)) of any tax imposed by subtitle A or by
Chapter 12 of subtitle B (relating to income taxes and gift taxes) is due to
negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations (but without
intent to defraud), there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 5%
of the underpayment.
93. J.T.S. Brown's Son Co., 10 T.C. 840 (1948); Barton v. Comm'r, 424 F.2d
1295 (7th Cir. 1970); George G. Ebner, [1958] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 108,
holding that failure to file a return constituted a disregard of the rules and
regulations.
94. Kilborn, 29 T.C. 102 (1957).
95. Guaranty Trust Company v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Wash.
1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1943). "It does not lie within the court's power to
change the penalties assessed. This is an administrative function."
96. See note 30, supra.
97. I.R.C. § 6653(b).
tolled when there is a negligent underpayment or intentional
disregarding of the rules and regulations. 8
(2) The Underpayment of Tax
In order for the negligence penalty to apply, there must be an
underpayment of tax. This amount is determined by the differ-
ence between the true tax liability and the amount shown on the
taxpayer's original return.99 The occurrence of a net operating
loss carryforward for the subsequent year will prevent the im-
position of the penalty to the extent it reduces or eliminates the
underpayment. This is not true of a net operating loss carry-
back.100 Furthermore, if any part of the underpayment is due to
negligence, the penalty applies to the entire underpayment. 10 1
As in the case of the delinquency penalty, this is the first
logical stage of dispute when contesting the imposition of the
negligence penalty.
(3) Seeking a Definition of Negligence
Negligence or intentional disregard of the rules and regula-
tions is not defined in the Code or the Regulations. However, the
Internal Revenue Manual is helpful in this regard by providing
the following definition of negligence:
Negligence, in the generally accepted legal sense, is the omission to do
something which a reasonable person, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
doing something which a prudent and reasonable person would not
do.102
Thus, there emerges a standard which is very similar to the
common law of torts, the average reasonable man concept. The
resulting test is what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent man
would have done under the circumstances, due care. 10 3 Inas-
much as the negligence penalty requires the appropriate mental
attitude, neglect, the analysis is reduced to questions of fact.
Accordingly, there are certain factual situations where the pen-
alty is most likely to arise.
(a) Adequate Books and Records. A taxpayer's failure to
98. I.R.C. § 6501(c).
99. See note 30, supra.
100. John Welborn Pusser v. Comm'r, 206 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1953). See also
note 40, supra.
101. Abrams v. United States, 449 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
102. II CCH, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT, NEGLIGENCE § 4560 at 8177
(1976).
103. Southeastern Finance Co. v. Comm'r, 153 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1946). See
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keep adequate books and records exposes him to the negligence
penalty. 10 4 The question of adequacy must be viewed in the light
of the needs and the types of businesses involved. 10 5 For in-
stance, a small service business may have adequate records
based on a checkbook and bank statements. On the other hand,
a more complicated business would probably be held negligent
if it maintained its records in the same way.
(b) Understatements of Income or Overstatements of De-
ductions. In the absence of an adequate explanation by the
taxpayer, a significant understatement of income'0 6 or an over-
statement of a deduction'0 7 is strong evidence of negligence.
Frequently, understatements of income are caused by omis-
sions of specific items of income, such as unreported sales
commissions, unreported income from medical services, divi-
dends, interests, capital gains, and so on. Also, what constitutes
an adequate explanation to rebut the presumption of negligence
may range from mistaken interpretations of law and fact to
good faith reliance on others.
(c) Reliance on Others. A taxpayer's reliance on others for
advice, for the keeping of records, or in the preparation of
returns, is another prolific area where the negligence penalty
may arise. As a general rule, the taxpayer has the ultimate
responsibility for errors in a return although he may have em-
ployed another to prepare the same.10 8 However, the penalty
may not apply if the taxpayer did in fact rely, 0 9 in good faith,110
Boynton v. Pedvick, 228 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1955). Penalty was imposed when
taxpayer did not follow advice of accountant.
104. I.R.C. § 6001; Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(b).
105. Charles W. Williams, [1954] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 199. The failure to
keep accounting records sufficiently accurate for income tax purposes may
constitute negligence. See also, Rainwater, 23 T.C. 450 (1954), where bookkeep-
ing methods did not retain records of daily receipts but kept adequate daily
summaries of carbon copies of betting tickets, the penalty was not imposed.
106. Marcello v. Comm'r, 380 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1967).
107. Poletti v. Comm'r, 330 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1964).
108. Pohlen v. Comm'r, 165 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1948).
109. Golden Nugget, Inc., [1969] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 149.
110. Tatem Woffard, 5 T.C. 1152 (1945). No penalty where the omission was a
result of good faith mistaken belief as to the legal effect of an assignment. See
also Carmack v. Comm'r, 183 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1950). Penalty was imposed when
taxpayer alleged in good faith he was unaware he had to report poker winnings.
upon the advice of a qualified counsel or accountant,"' making
full disclosure of all relevant facts to the same. 1 2 Nonetheless,
an adverse finding may result if the expert tax advice was in
conflict with known rules and regulations."3
(d) Intentional Disregard of Rules and Regulations. A 5%
penalty is imposed not only for negligence, but for intentional
disregard of the rules and regulations. Before the "intentional
disregard" language was added to the statute, the Regulations
declared that the negligence penalty would in fact apply if a
taxpayer computed his tax in disregard of the instructions on
the tax return. 1 4 Subsequently, it was held that the penalty
would not apply when a taxpayer computed his tax, disregard-
ing the Regulations, provided he made full disclosure of his
method of computation. 15 Hence, the reason for the enactment
of the "intentional disregard" language was to expressly pro-
hibit such cases.
Nevertheless, the Tax Court has held, notwithstanding the
enactment of the "intentional disregard" language to the stat-
ute, that the penalty will not apply to a taxpayer for having
intentionally disregarded the rules and regulations provided he
makes full disclosure in good faith. 1 6 The penalty has been
imposed, however, where good faith is lacking, as in such cases
where the taxpayer repeatedly took large deductions for per-
sonal expenses,"17 took large unsubstantiated deductions," 8
claimed deductions known from a previous audit not to be de-
ductible,"19 or reported no income on grounds that tax was un-
constitutional. 20
(4) Recommendations by the Conference
111. Brown v. Comm'r, 398 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1968). No penalty was
assessed when airline pilots failed to report strike benefits on attorney's advice.
112. Davis Regulator Co., 36 B.T.A. 437 (1937); Pullman Inc., 8 T.C. 292 (1947).
Penalty was not imposed when taxpayer omitted receipt of income due to a
bona fide belief it was not taxable. However, sufficient information was found
in balance sheet attached to his return to notify the I.R.S. of the transaction.
113. Journal Co., 46 B.T.A. 841 (1942). Penalty was imposed when taxpayer
relied on counsel's advice not to follow rules and regulations.
114. A.R.M. 23 C.B. 2, 231 (1920).
115. A.R.M. 105 C.B. 4, 322 (1921).
116. Wesley Heat Trucking Co., 30 T.C. 10 (1958). Penalty was not imposed
where sufficient information was disclosed in the return to inform the Commis-
sioner of the nature of deductions taken by taxpayer in the honest belief that
they were proper.
117. McKissock, [1969] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 105.
118. Tomsykoski, [1974] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 105.
119. Drew, [1972] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 40.
120. Lamb, [1973] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 71.
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The Conference adopted the following recommendations in
order to achieve greater fairness and effectiveness when apply-
ing the negligence penalty.
(a) Recommendation 75-7(b)(1)(i), 75-7(b)(1)(ii), 75(b)(2),
75(b)(3). The Conference recommends retention of the negli-
gence penalty with the corresponding burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence falling upon the taxpayer.
Moreover, negligence would be redefined to mean "failure to
excercise reasonable care in keeping records or in preparing the
tax return." The Conference also recommends that the present
5% penalty for intentional disregard of rules and regulations,
but without intent to defraud, be repealed.
The Conference's rationale for retention of the 5% negligence
penalty is that, if the current 5% rate is increased in order to
deter further unintentional conduct, the effect would be de
minimis.121 Since simple negligence as opposed to intentional
crimes is less blameworthy and less in need of rehabilitation, it
is less likely to be deterred by threat of punishment. Adoption of
a definition of negligence in the statute itself is probably based
on the contention that, since the present statute and Regulations
lack such a definition, the inclusion of one would provide great-
er clarity when its imposition is being considered. Furthermore,
the deletion of the "intentional disregard" language contained
in the present statute is based upon the belief that it is
. . . confusing and superfluous. If it is designed to penalize taxpayers
who decline to follow a disputed regulation, the penalty is inapprop-
riate and should be repealed. When there is a bona fide dispute of
law-over the validity of a regulation . . . the taxpayer should be
allowed to assert his position without penalty and without conspicu-
ously redflagging the item. 12
2
In response to these recommendations, the Service did not
agree.
The concept of negligence, however subjective or amorphous it may
appear to be, is well developed in legal practice and judicial prece-
dent. For this reason, the Service would prefer to see no change in the
current definition of 'negligence'. 123
In concurring with the Conference's recommendation, the
Service should adopt said recommendation notwithstanding
121. See note 80, supra at 652.
122. Id. at 658.
123. See note 81, supra.
their assertion that "the concept of negligence. . . is well devel-
oped" judicially. First, it is disputable whether negligence is
judicially well defined. Hence, the proposed legislative defini-
tion may add a degree of precision to the judicial definition.
Second, assuming arguendo that negligence is judicially well
defined, the proposed legislative definition of negligence
conforms to the general judicial standard of "lack of reasonable
care." It is conceded that to attempt a more precise definition of
negligence would probably create more problems that it would
solve. Adoption of the legislative definition will do no harm and
possibly some good in terms of legislative and judicial clarity.
Furthermore, the "intentional disregard" language in the stat-
ute should be repealed. Implicit in the penalty itself is the as-
sumption that the rules and regulations are invariably right and
correctly interpret the statute. Obviously, this is not true. A
taxpayer ought to be able to "disregard" a particular rule or
regulation upon good faith and good reason. Moreover, he
should be allowed to show his reasons for disregarding a regula-
tion at any time, whether or not these reasons have been expre-
ssly stated on the return. If he intentionally disregards any rule
or regulation without a reasonable basis for doing so, it would
fall within the definition of negligence and thus invite the im-
position of the penalty. Although there is case authority for the
proposition that a taxpayer may rely in good faith upon expert
tax advice when intentionally disregarding a rule or regulation
for good reason, the judicial authority is weak and conflicting.
Deletion of the "intentional disregard" language within the pre-
sent statute would promote predictability and at the same time,
further fairness and greater effectiveness.
(b) Recommendation 75-7(b)(3)(i) and 75-7(b)(3)(ii). The
Conference recommends that a new penalty be established for
"reckless or intentional conduct (but without willful attempt to
evade payment of tax)." The rate of this new ad valorem penalty
would be fixed at some point between the 5% negligence penalty
and the 50% civil fraud penalty, perhaps 25%. "Reckless
conduct" would be defined as conscious disregard of the "sub-
stantial risk that an underpayment would occur." "Intentional
conduct" would be defined as "meaning that in keeping records
or preparing the tax return, the taxpayer knew that an under-
payment would occur or was substantially certain to occur."
Moreover, the taxpayer would have the burden to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that his conduct was not reckless or
intentional.
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The Conference's purpose underlying this recommendation is
to punish a certain type of misconduct which is something more
than simple negligence and less than civil fraud.124 This form of
misconduct involves a mental attitude of "recklessness" and the
current 5% negligence penalty is not a sufficient deterrent
against such misconduct. However, there is no present penalty
between the 5% negligence penalty and 50% civil fraud penalty,
the latter penalty being reserved solely for blatantly culpable
conduct. Consequently, an intermediate penalty for overstate-
ment of deductions or understatement of income which is reck-
less or intentional but short of willful, would provide the neces-
sary deterrent effect.
The Service responded to this particular recommendation in
total opposition. Although they agreed that the 5% negligence
penalty is not an adequate deterrent, it contended the establish-
ment of a new intermediate penalty to make up for the short-
comings of the negligence penalty would do more harm than
good. 125 No matter how "well-defined a new intermediate penal-
ty might be, it can only complicate" the administrative burden
to such an extent that the burdens would outweigh the benefits
gained.
Such an approach ... presents serious administrative problems.
Which penalty to apply would have to be determined partially by the
kind of conduct involved, and partially by whether that conduct ac-
counted for a substantial portion of the underpayment. As a result,
adoption of this recommendation would impose upon the examining
agent the responsibility of determining which penalty should properly
apply to each item of the deficiency. This in turn would lead to case by
case inconsistencies in the application of penalty provisions. 126
In lieu of the Conference's proposal, the Service suggests that
the rate of the negligence penalty be raised from 5% to 10%. The
higher rate would have a greater deterrent value while increas-
ing the Service's incentive in pursuing cases of negligence.
This writer concurs with the Service's position, that the
Conference's recommendation in establishing a new inter-
124. See note 80 supra at 649-51.
125. See note 81 supra.
While the Service agrees that the 5 percent negligence penalty is not an
adequate deterrent to non-compliance, a convincing case has not been
made tor a new intermediate level civil penalty as a better alternative to
increasing the present negligence penalty.
126. See note 81 supra.
mediate penalty should not be adopted. It is difficult enough at
present to determine whether various types of misconduct
constitute criminal fraud, civil fraud, negligence, or none of the
foregoing. Furthermore, there is probably a substantial lack of
uniformity among the Service's personnel when applying vari-
ous civil penalties. To interpose another gradation would mere-
ly complicate the administration of the tax laws and tend to add
to the lack of uniformity. Essentially, the Conference's recom-
mendation is to gradate degrees of negligence, short of willful
evasion. Although it is theoretically meritorious, it is question-
able whether it is administratively practical, especially in light
of President Carter's interest in tax simplification.
However, if the intermediate penalty is adopted, the burden of
proof should not fall on the taxpayer, but shift to the govern-
ment to show by a preponderance of evidence that the taxpayer
engaged in the prescribed conduct. Although the taxpayer pos-
sesses the facts of his alleged misconduct in his own mind, and
therefore he is in a better position to rebut the presumption, the
possibility of abuse of this penalty by the Service is substantial
enough to warrant shifting the burden to the government. In
this manner, the Service will assert the penalty only when they
are reasonably certain of the facts involved.
C. The Civil Fraud Penalty
In the event there is an underpayment of tax due to fraud, a
civil fraud penalty may be imposed based upon 50% of the total
underpayment. 127 The imposition of the civil fraud penalty upon
the underpaying taxpayer is the most drastic and severe of all
the ad valorem penalties.
(1) Burden of Proof
The burden of persuasion in proving fraud is on the Commis-
sioner, 128 and the standard of proof to be established is clear and
convincing evidence, not a preponderance. 129 Seldom does the
Commissioner have direct evidence of fraud, as in the case
where a taxpayer admits to such. Absent such evidence, the
underpaying taxpayer's state of mind must be proved by cir-
cumstantial evidence. 30
127. I.R.C. § 6653(b).
128. I.R.C. § 7454.
129. M. Rea Gano, 19 B.T.A. 518 (1930); Hawkins v. Comm'r, 234 F.2d 359 (6th
Cir. 1956).
130. Day, Trans. [1965] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 326.
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When a taxpayer pleads nolo contendere to a criminal fraud
charge, the plea is not direct evidence concerning the civil fraud
assessment,' 3 1 although it may be used for impeachment pur-
poses.1 32 When a taxpayer pleads guilty to the same above, this
is direct but not conclusive evidence concerning the civil fraud
assessment. 33 However, a conviction for criminal fraud collat-
erally estops the taxpayer from denying the civil fraud assess-
ment 1 34 for the same year. The conviction is deemed res judicata
on the issue of civil fraud. The court will, nonetheless, review
the conviction if it is "tainted" with improper acts of the trial
court.1 35 On the other hand, an acquittalfrom a criminal charge
does not bar the Commissioner from assessing the civil fraud
penalty. The criminal and civil aspects may therefore be deter-
mined under two differing standards of proof, e.g. beyond a
reasonable doubt and clear and convincing evidence respec-
tively.3 6
It should be noted that although the burden of proof rests with
the Commissioner as to civil fraud, the assessed underpayment
is itself presumed to be correct until the taxpayer rebuts the
presumption. If both parties fail because of inadequate proof on
their respective issues, the underpayment will be sustained
while the civil fraud penalty will be set aside. 37
Also, the Commissioner is not relieved of his burden of proof
even though the taxpayer fails to appear at trial. Unless the
Commissioner comes forth with satisfactory evidence, the civil
fraud penalty will fail.
38
(2) Methods of Investigation
Ordinarily, fraud is discovered in the course of a revenue
131. B. Frank Wells, Jr., [1958] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 160.
132. Kilpatrick v. Comm'r, 227 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1955).
133. Bennett E. Mayers, 21 T.C. 331 (1953). The plea of guilty made in a
criminal proceeding involving the same matter constitutes an admission against
interest, and without any explanation of the circumstances surrounding the
plea, is sufficient to establish fraud.
134. Thomas Worcester, Inc., [1965] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 199, rev'd and
vacated on this point, Worcester v. Comm'r, 370 F.2d 713 (lst Cir. 1966), due to
tainted evidence. See also, Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1964).
135. Id.
136. See note 21, supra.
137. Carter v. Campbell, 264 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1959).
138. Perez, [1974] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 211. Harold Delaney, [1958] TAx
CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 185.
agent's examination of taxpayer's books and records while
conducting a tax audit. However, if the taxpayer's books and
records are unavailable because they were destroyed or are
privileged, then the Commissioner may prove fraud in estab-
lishing an underpayment by various methods of reconstructing
income and by locating specific sources of omitted income. Two
basic methods of reconstructing income are set forth below but
are not intended to be exhaustive.
(a) Bank deposit method of proving underpayment. Under
this method, bank deposits are compared to reported income.139
Large unexplained bank deposits may be treated as income in
proving a fraudulent underpayment. A great discrepancy be-
tween large bank deposits and small reported gross income is
evidence of fraudulent intent.1 40 However, large unexplained
bank deposits, standing alone, are generally insufficient to sus-
tain the Commissioner's burden. The Commissioner must also
prove a likely taxable source for the deposits.14 1 If the circum-
stances show that the deposits could only have a taxable source,
the fraud penalty will be imposed. 42 Also, the bank deposit
method is used in criminal tax fraud cases but the standard of
proof is a crucial factor since the burden of proof in a criminal
case is much greater.
(b) Net worth method of proving underpayment. The net
worth of a taxpayer at any particular time is the difference
between his assets and liabilities on the date in question. 143 The
increase in the taxpayers net worth at the close of the taxable
year over his net worth at the beginning of the year is ascer-
tained, and then compared to the taxpayer's reported income to
determine whether there is a discrepancy. A discrepancy so
found is evidence of fraudulent intent. However, the Commis-
sioner must also prove a taxable source for the additional in-
come'4 before the civil fraud penalty may be imposed. This
particular accounting technique for determination of unreport-
ed income is the same whether civil fraud or criminal fraud is
involved.14 5 The chief difference is, again, the differing standard
for burden of proof.
139. Halle v. Comm'r, 175 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1949).
140. Puritan Church of America v. Comm'r, 209 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
141. Armes v. Comm'r, 448 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1971).
142. Malone v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1952).
143. Kashat v. Comm'r, 229 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1956).
144. McKenzie, [1974] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1968.
145. Kenney v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1940).
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(c) Methods of investigation subject to judicial re-
view. The civil fraud penalty may not be avoided even though
the Commissioner's method of investigation of the alleged fraud
becomes overzealous, or possibly unethical. The Tax Court has
no jurisdiction to inquire into the Commissioner's conduct. 146
However, when criminal penalties become involved, the
Commissioner's method of investigation is subject to judicial
review to afford the taxpayer his 4th Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the 5th Amend-
ment privilege against self incrimination. For example, the
privilege against self incrimination does not apply to prevent
civil fraud judgment, but it may possibly be invoked to prevent
the Commissioner from obtaining information from the taxpay-
er in a civil fraud case if- said information may be used against
him in a criminal fraud case.
(3) Statute of Limitations
The normal statute of limitations for imposing ad valorem
penalties is three years after the due date for filing.147 However,
this period may be extended to six years148 after the return is
filed when there is an understatement in excess of 25% of the
amount of gross income stated in the return. When no return is
filed, there is no statute of limitations. 149
Most importantly, where fraud is attributed to the underpay-
ment, or a part thereof, there is no statute of limitations. 5 0 Thus,
the civil fraud penalty may be imposed at any time upon the
discovery of fraud. However, the fairness of this rule seems
questionable, in light of cases where the rule becomes oppres-
sive and causes extreme hardship. For example, the Commis-
sioner was allowed to open up tax years dating back to World
War II where a taxpayer claimed he paid out to suppliers in
those particular years as much as he received in sales
receipts.15 '
146. H.F. Kerr, 5 B.T.A. 1073 (1927).
147. I.R.C. § 6501.
148. Id.
149. See note 50, supra.
150. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(2); Homer L. Blackwell, [1961] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH)
124.
151. Jackson v. Comm'r, 380 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1967). See also Lowry v.
489
(4) Underpayment of Tax
Before the civil fraud penalty may be imposed, there must be
an underpayment of tax. If there is no underpayment, there is
no penalty notwithstanding the presence of fraudulent intent.
The underpayment is the difference between the true tax liabili-
ty and the amount due as reflected on the taxpayers original
return.152 Amended returns, 153 delinquent returns,'5 4 or pay-
ments of tax after the original return is filed and while an audit
is in progress 5 5 will not affect the operation of the civil fraud
penalty. Furthermore, a net operating loss carryback will not
affect the computation of an underpayment for a prior year, as
opposed to a net operating loss carryforward. 156
One of the most criticized aspects of this penalty is that it
applies to the total underpayment, even though only a small
portion of said underpayment was due to fraud. For example,
when a taxpayer in good faith and without fault, neither negli-
gently or fraudulently fails to report specific items of income,
and negligently fails to report other items of income, the entire
underpayment is nonetheless subject to the civil fraud penalty if
any part of it is tainted with fraud. 57
In light of the above, examining the underpayment is the first
logical stage when contesting the imposition of the civil fraud
penalty. When doing so, it is important to pay attention to both
fraud tainted items and non fraud tainted items, such as depre-
ciated allowances, business expenses, and similar deductions.
Whatever item is eliminated from the underpayment, whether it
be tainted with fraud or not, will reduce the amount of the
penalty proportionately.
(5) Seeking a Definition of Civil Fraud
There is no specific statutory or judicial definition of civil
fraud. It is not defined in the Code or the Regulations. There-
fore, a cursory examination of several sources defining what
constitutes fraud may prove helpful in seeking a definition of
Comm'r, 288 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1961), for a special case of hardship and inequity.
152. Aaron v. Hirschman, 12 T.C. 1223 (1949); Sam Broadhead, [1955] TAX
CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 328, aff'd, 254 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1958).
153. Aaron v. Hirschman, 12 T.C. 1223 (1949).
154. Charles F. Bennett, 30 T.C. 114 (1958). Fraud was associated with delib-
erate failure to file a return in the first instance.
155. Bennie F. Stewart, 66 T.C. 54 (1976); Romm v. Comm'r, 245 F.2d 730 (4th
Cir. 1957).
156. See notes 38 and 39, supra.
157. Johnson v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 103 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
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such an elusive concept. Blacks Law Dictionary defines fraud in
general as,
An intentional perversion of truth .... A generic term, embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are
resorted to by one individual to get advantage. . . . 'Bad faith' and
fraud is synomymous, and also synonyms of dishonesty, infidelity,
faithlessness, perfidy, unfairness, etc. 158
Prosser's definition of the common law tort concept of fraud
involves the following elements: a false material representation
by defendant, with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disre-
gard of its veracity, with intent to induce plaintiff to act or not to
act in reliance thereof, causing plaintiff to rely, resulting in
injury.159
Mertens definition of the statutory concept of civil fraud
states that
The term 'fraud' means actual intentional wrong doing, and the intent
required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be owing.
Fraud implies bad faith, intentional wrongdoing, and a sinister mo-
tive. It is never imputed or presumed .... "I
The Internal Revenue Manual defines this statutory concept
of civil fraud as follows:
To successfully maintain a charge of fraud in a tax case, it is neces-
sary to establish that a part of the deficiency is due to a false material
representation of facts by the taxpayer and that he/she had knowledge
of its falsity and intended that it be acted upon or accepted as the
truth.161
By examining the above mentioned authorities, there emerges
the essential element of fraud common to all, being the requisite
state of mind of specific intent to deceive, or in the case of tax
fraud, the specific intent to evade the tax. A closer examination
of the above also illustrates that the Code distinguishes the
common law tort concept of fraud by framing a slightly differ-
ent statutory concept of civil tax fraud. This distinction involves
the Code's deletion of the provision that "reckless disregard" is
sufficient in and of itself to trigger the penalty. Thus, the statu-
tory concept of civil tax fraud appears to require actual knowl-
edge of the falsehood only, reckless disregard alone being insuf-
158. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 788 (4th ed. 1968).
159. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
160. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 5510 (1976).
161. II CCH, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT, INTRODUCTION, § 4563.41 at
8177-8 (1977).
ficient. However, as the cases indicate, this is not necessarily
true, reckless disregard may constitute fraud.
It can be safely said that what constitutes fraud is again a
question of fact. However, there are certain "badges of fraud"'162
which frequently arise when the fraud penalty is imposed. They
are aptly set forth in the following quote from the United States
Supreme Court.
By way of illustration, and not by way of limitation, we would think
affirmative wilful attempt may be inferred from conduct such as
keeping a double set of books, making false entries or alterations, or
false invoices or documents, destruction of books or records, con-
cealment of assets or covering up sources of income, handling of one's
affairs to avoid making the records usual in transactions of the kind,
and any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to
conceal. If the tax-evasion motive plays any part in such conduct the
offense may be made out even though the conduct may also serve
other purposes such as concealment of other crime.163
There are two common factual situations, although not ex-
haustive, where fraud may be found. One situation involves
intentional failure to file any tax return whatsoever, in contrast
to delinquency, while the other involves the filing of an inten-
tional false tax return, in contrast to negligence.
(a) Civil Fraud and Delinquency Compared. As noted in
above, the delinquency penalty is imposed for failure to file. The
fact of failing to file, however, may also trigger the civil fraud
penalty provided the necessary mental attitude of specific in-
tent is present. Simple failure to file, absent the requisite state of
mind is insufficient to establish fraud. When failure to file is
coupled with other factors indicating the specific intent to do
the same, fraud may then be established. Examples of such
factors include taxpayers lying to revenue agents, 164 offering no
explanation concerning his failure to file, 65 sophistication in
terms of education or business experience, 166 concealment of
income, 167 consistent failure to file, 68 and so forth.
162. Mornoff, [1955] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 243; Ben H. Logan, [1976] TAX
CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 143. One of the so-called "badges of fraud", lack of
cooperation with revenue agents, is to be ignored when a potential for criminal
proceedings pervades the civil investigation.
163. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943).
164. Kubik, Trans., [1974] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 62; Broyhill, [1968] TAX.
CT. MEM. DEC. (CC) 25.
165. Robinson, [1968] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 28.
166. Klebanoff, [1973] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 174.
167. Jones v. Comm'r, 259 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1958). Failure to file is not
enough to establish fraud. The taxpayer kept accurate books and records; no
attempt to conceal income was indicated since he fully cooperated with revenue
agents.
168. Richard Law, 2 T.C. 623 (1943).
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It is important to take special note of the existing conflict
between circuits concerning the question of what constitutes
specific intent to evade tax. For example, the Eighth Circuit
suggests that intentional failure to file in the absence of affirma-
tive acts of fraud will not sustain the penalty. 169 Conversely, the
Fourth Circuit refuses to hold to the above and asserts that
intentional failure to file, notwithstanding the absence of affir-
mative acts of fraud, may sustain the civil fraud penalty pro-
vided "bad faith" or "intentional wrongdoing" is present.170
(b) Civil Fraud and Negligence Compared. As stated pre-
viously, the negligence penalty is imposed for filing false tax
returns negligently prepared. Nonetheless, when a falsely pre-
pared tax return is coupled with the necessary mental attitude
of specific intent to do the same, the civil fraud penalty will be
imposed. Simple negligence alone is insufficient to establish
fraud.'17
When negligence becomes reckless, when tax returns are
made in reckless disregard of their veracity, the issue of
whether it is negligence or fraud becomes more complicated.
This is not a clear area of the law. Although the code impliedly
requires actual knowledge of falsehood, there is case authority
to support the proposition that tax returns prepared or state-
ments made in reckless disregard of their veracity may be suffi-
cient to infer fraud. 7
2
Factors which may determine the outcome of this controver-
sial issue include, whether the Commissioner can carry his bur-
den of persuasion to the standard of clear and convincing proof,
whether a taxpayer's books and records were so grossly inade-
quate as to indicate specific intent, whether understatements of
deductions were so blatant as to overwhelm the plausibility of
169. First Trust and Savings Bank of Davenport, Iowa v. United States, 206
F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1953). The taxpayer never filed an income tax return and there
was no other "badge of fraud" except the taxpayer believed he had no taxable
income and therefore no tax due and owing.
170. Powell v. Granquist, 252 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1958). A penalty was imposed
when the taxpayer's failure to file resulted from his disapproval of the way the
government was run in addition to his conviction against paying taxes.
171. Mitchell v. Comm'r, 118 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1941). Negligence, slight or
great, is not enough to establish fraud.
172. White v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 623 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
negligence, and whether a taxpayer's defense of reliance on
another party was in fact made in good faith.
The Board of Tax Appeals provided a very good summation
of what the court requires when construing reckless negligence
to be tantamount to fraud.
Isolated instances of discrepancy or occasional lapses from the rigid
accountability contemplated by the law might conceivable be over-
looked, but where the whole fabric of petitioner's tax accounting is
permeated with gross error, where elaborate artifice is employed to
accomplish the ends sought, where the evidence adduced in explana-
tion on different occasions varies so as to make it all unreliable, where
sworn statements are proven by records to be false, and where the
errors both of law and of fact all'tend to accomplish a reduction of
apparent tax liability, the situation goes beyond mere fortuitous
coincidence, or unintentional error. It evidences a purpose to evade.1 73
(6) The Conference's Recommendation
The Conference also recommends an important change for
the improvement of the civil fraud penalty.
(a) Recommendation 75-7(b)(4). The Conference recom-
mends that the present civil fraud penalty be redefined to apply
only to the "willful attempt to evade payment of tax," and that
this "should be understood to have the same meaning as Section
7201 of the Internal Revenue Code," the criminal tax evasion
section. The reason for expressly equating the civil fraud sec-
tion to that of the criminal fraud section, notwithstanding the
difference in burden of proof, is to avoid definitional ambiguity.
Although the Service rejected this recommendation, it should
nonetheless be fully adopted and the corresponding Code sec-
tion amended. Except for the burden of proof, there is little
difference between willful evasion under criminal tax fraud or
under civil tax fraud. Evidence of this close relationship is re-
flected by the fact that conviction for criminal tax fraud oper-
ates as a collateral estoppel against a taxpayer's denial of civil
tax fraud.17 4 Also, the United States Supreme Court held that
the term "willful" has essentially the same meaning in the mis-
demeanor section of the tax laws as in the felony sections. 175
Although the term is not used in the civil fraud sections, willful-
ness i.e. specific intent to evade, is as much a crucial element of
the civil penalty as it is for a criminal offense. Thus, a uniform
meaning of tax fraud, applicable to criminal and civil tax sec-
tions alike, would provide greater definitional accuracy and
173. M. Rea Gano, 19 B.T.A. 518, 533 (1930).
174. Lefkowitz v. Tomlinson, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964).
175. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
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precision should the proposed definition be enacted.
(b) Recommendation 75-7 (b)(5). The Conference recom-
mends that when imposing penalties for underpayment of tax-
es, "each penalty rate should be applied only to the portion of
the total underpayment that is attributable to conduct liable for
penalty at such rate." In other words, the penalty would only
attach to that portion of the underpayment tainted by the mis-
conduct, fraud or negligence. As stated above, both the civil
fraud penalty and the negligence penalty currently apply to the
total underpayment when either fraud or negligence taints any
part of said underpayment. 176
Although the Service rejected this recommendation for the
reason that implementing such a policy would impose too great
an administrative burden, the Conference's recommendation
should be accepted because it seeks to conform tax penalties
with basic principles of fairness and equity. Under current law,
factual situations concerning underpayments arise leading to
severe and opppressive results when a relatively small portion
of the total underpayment is due to fraud or negligence.177 It
seems only reasonable, not to mention fair, that these respective
penalties should attach only upon that part of the underpay-
ment attributable to it, and not to that portion of the underpay-
ment completely unrelated to fraud or negligence.
It should be noted that the Conference's recommendations do
not suggest changing the rates for civil fraud or negligence. It is
questionable whether the 5% negligence penalty applying to
that portion of the underpayment tainted with negligence will
176. Example . Corporation A and Corporation B each report taxable
income of $300,000. Upon audit it is determined that Corporation A has addition-
al income of $250,000, of which $50,000 is attributable to fraud, and that Corpo-
ration B has $50,000 of additional income all of which is contributable to fraud.
A. Under current law, Corporation A would owe additional tax of $120,000
(48% of $250,000), plus a fraud penalty of $60,000 (50% of $120,000). Corporation
B would owe additional tax of $24,000, plus a fraud penalty of $12,000 (50% of
$24,000). The fraud penalty asserted against Corporation A would thus be five
times as great as the fraud penalty asserted against Corporation B, although the
fraud-tainted items of both are in the same amount.
B. Under the Conference's proposed change, the fraud penalty applied on both
corporations would be limited to $12,000 (i.e. 50% of the deficiency attributable
to the fraud-tainted items).
177. Johnson v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 103 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
provide sufficient deterrence against such misconduct. If the
Conference's recommendation is enacted, it may be necessary
to raise the negligence penalty, perhaps 10% in order to provide
an effective deterrent effect. Otherwise, it may be prudent to
reject the recommendation as it applies to the negligence
penalty.
Concerning civil fraud, the recommendation should be adopt-
ed without reservation. Not only is the rate, 50% stiff enough to
satisfy the deterrence aspect, but there is also the additional
deterrent of possible criminal prosecution.
While recommending that the civil fraud and negligence
penalties should apply only to the underpayments attributable
to each of them respectively, the Conference does not indicate
how the penalty will be computed. One such method of compu-
tation is suggested as follows. Where the fraud penalty is in-
volved, the penalty would be computed on the difference be-
tween the total underpayment, and the underpayment
computed by excluding the fraud tainted items. This would
result in the fraud penalty being asserted at the highest applica-
ble tax bracket. If the negligence penalty is involved, the same
method would apply. Where "non tainted" items, fraud tainted
items, and negligence tainted items are all involved, the same
computation would apply.178
178. Example II. Computation of fraud penalty under Conference's pro-
posed change to provide for penalty being computed at taxpayer's highest
bracket.
Assume a joint tax return reflecting $50,000 of taxable income, corrected in-
come of $60,000, and that $4,000 of the additional $10,000 of income is attribut-
able to fraud.
A. The penalty would be computed on the difference between (1) total under-
payment, and (2) underpayment computed by excluding the fraud-tainted items,
thus:
Tax on corrected income of $60,000 (53% bracket) $22,300
Tax on $50,000 per return ............................................ 17,060
Total underpaym ent .............................................. $ 5,240
Tax on $56,000 (corrected income of $60,000
less $4,000 fraud-tainted items) ........................... $20,180
Tax on $50,000 per return ............................................ 17,060
Underpayment excluding fraud-tainted item $ 3,120
Underpayment attributable to fraud-tainted item $ 2,120
Fraud penalty on $2,120 at 50% ................................... $ 1,060
Check: 53% of $4,000 equals $2,120 of additional
tax attributable to this item. 50% fraud penalty $ 1,060
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Another computational problem arises concerning the defini-
tion of "underpayment" when fraud or negligence is attribut-
able to a delinquent tax return, the failure to file situation.
Under current law, the entire tax and not merely the deficiency
is treated as the underpayment.'7 9 Consequently, the 50% civil
fraud or 5% negligence penalty is computed on the entire tax
since it is deemed the underpayment. Also, it has been held that
if the return is delinquent, no credit is allowed in computing the
penalty for taxes withheld or payments of estimated tax.180 This
is especially unfair and may cause harsh and oppressive results
when a respective penalty is applied to such a situation.
It should be noted that the Conference did not address itself to
this issue. Nevertheless, the Conference or Service should rede-
fine "underpayment" not only to include fraud or negligence
tainted items, but also allow credit for withheld taxes or es-
timated tax payments made before the due date.'8 '
(c) Recommendation 75-7(c). The Conference recommends
that the Service seek statutory instruction with respect to pub-
licizing the imposition of the 50% civil fraud penalty.
Although the Service agreed to this recommendation and will
B. Under current law, penalty would be 50% of total underpayment of $5,240,
or $2,620.
179. I.R.C. § 6653(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 301.6653-1(c); 22 THE TAX LAW. 967
(Summer 1969).
180. Cirillo v. Comm'r, 314 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1963); Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz,
334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964).
181. Example III. Assume the same facts as in Example II, except that
return is filed late, and prior to due date of return the tax on $50,000 ($17,060) has
been paid by withholding and estimated tax payments.
A. Under current law, the fraud penalty would be computed as follows:
Tax on corrected income of $60,000 ........................... $22,300
Fraud penalty (no credit being allowed for
withholding or estimated tax payments)
50% x $22,300 ........................................................... $11,150
B. Under the Conference's proposed change, limiting the penalty to fraud-
tainted items and allowing credit for withholding and estimated tax payments,
the underpayment would be $5,240 and the fraud penalty would be $1,060, as in
Example II.
C. Rejecting the Conference's proposed change, not limiting penalty to fraud-
tainted items but allowing credit for withholding and estimated tax payments
made before the due date of return in determining underpayment, the penalty
would be 50% of $5,240 or $2,620.
"seek such statutory instruction 8 2 it should not be adopted. The
government's policy of publicizing tax indictments would seem
to be a sufficient in terrorem device. When a fraud case is
docketed in the Tax Court, the proposed fraud penalty becomes
a matter of public record and is often reported in the press.
Moreover, the average citizen does not distinguish between
criminal fraud and civil fraud. If the deterrent publicity of tax
fraud indictments and docketed fraud cases does not restrain a
taxpayer, the additional publicity attending the mere assertion
of a fraud penalty will not do so. Many agents assert the penalty
on relatively weak facts, and many cases are settled on the basis
of a negligence penalty or no penalty. Even if a settlement in-
volves payment of the fraud penalty, publicity of that fact is not
justified. Such cases often involve many issues, and the taxpay-
er's agreement to the penalty may simply be one way of "dispos-
ing" of the whole problem, without constituting an admission of
fraud. In this manner, the recommendation is unsound, and
could set a dangerous precedent for making inroads upon a
taxpayer's confidentiality.
IV. CONCLUSION
The delinquency, negligence, and civil fraud penalties all
serve to deter the underpaying taxpayer from particular forms
of misconduct. Such misconduct involves a particular state of
mind, or lack thereof. For delinquency, the misconduct is sim-
ple failure to file a tax return. No particular mental attitude
need be present to trigger this penalty. The failure itself is suffi-
cient in the absence of reasonable cause. For negligence, the
misconduct is failure to file a tax return or a falsely prepared
timely filed tax return, coupled with the necessary mental at-
titude of neglect. For this penalty, the taxpayer has the burden
to prove the essential element lacking, or in the alternative, due
care present. For civil fraud, the misconduct is failure to file a
tax return or a falsely prepared timely filed tax return, coupled
with the necessary mental attitude of specific intent to evade the
tax. The Commissioner has the burden to prove the essential
element present. Consequently, it is possible to conceptualize
the appropriate state of mind, or lack thereof, to correspond to a
"sliding scale" in reference to its respective penalty. As the
penalty shifts from delinquency through negligence to civil
fraud, the requisite state of mind becomes stronger. Also, the
burden of proof provides an interesting twist to the scale. Reck-
lessness, falling in the area between negligence and civil fraud,
182. See note 81, supra.
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is the source of the greatest difficulty in ascertaining the true
state of mind, in order to impose the appropriate civil penalty.
In considering the above mentioned penalties and their re-
spective consequences, a taxpayer should pay due heed to the
risks involved in simple carelessness, negligent carelessness, or
intentional carelessness by not complying with the principle
that our federal revenue system is based upon the honor system
of self enforcement. 18
3
ARTHUR A. GRAVES III
183. Bukowski v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 91, 96 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
Come the Ides of March a taxpayer in performing his duty as a citizen in
assessing his own taxes may not close his eyes to facts with which he is
confronted daily, and, on being called to account, escape the conse-
quences by saying, 'I didn't take time to read it (the return) over.'
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